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ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing on the work of Foucault, we develop an integrated framework for understanding how risk is 
organized in three different modes – prospectively, in real-time, and retrospectively. We show how 
these modes are situated in a dominant discourse of risk that leads organizations to normalize risk in 
particular ways by privileging certain forms of knowledge and authorizing certain risk identities over 
others. In addition to identifying the common way in which risk is organized in each mode and 
showing how it is held in place by the dominant discourse, we propose alternative ways to organize risk 
that resist this dominant discourse, and we explain why they are difficult to enact. We then extend our 
analysis by theorizing how, even when resistance to the dominant discourse of risk occurs, it can 
contribute to ‘riskification’, with more and more organizing undertaken in the name of risk, due to 
intensification, discipline and governmentality. 
 
Keywords: risk, discourse, power, resistance, Foucault   
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In 2008, the Global Financial Crisis hit world markets. It was attributed to the growing 
use of computer-based risk models that enabled financial institutions, especially in the 
US, to sell ever more complex financial products, including mortgage-backed securities. 
The securitization of mortgages, especially subprime lending, coupled with failures of 
rating agencies to accurately assess risk led to untold casualties. Companies like Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers failed. Others like AIG had to be bailed out by the US 
Government. The ‘toxic’ financial instruments were sold internationally, causing 
problems in Iceland, Ireland, Greece, and other nations. The negative impact was 
significant. Assets estimated at more than US$4 trillion were written off as a result of 
the GFC, while the U.S. government committed almost US$9 trillion to dealing with its 
effects. Jobs were lost around the world and as many as 200 million people may have 
been pushed into poverty by the resulting recession. (Adapted from Gerding, 2009; 
Lounsbury & Hirsch, 2010; Munir, 2011.) 
*** 
In March 2011, Japan was hit by a major earthquake – magnitude 9 on the Richter 
scale – followed by a tsunami which swamped the Fukushima district, including a 
nuclear energy facility built close to the coast, knocking out the generators which 
provided the power to cool the core reactor. The owner – TEPCO – had not considered 
a tsunami to pose a significant risk to the plant and yet this one triggered the world’s 
worst nuclear catastrophe in a quarter of a century. As the reactor went into a 
meltdown, concerns began to escalate that the resulting radioactivity could require 
mass evacuations, including the 35 million living in Tokyo. Although Tokyo was not 
evacuated, the area around Fukushima was. More than 15,000 individuals died as a 
result of the tsunami and 6,000 were injured. 3,000 people were still missing and over 
300,000 were still living in temporary accommodation as of 2012. TEPCO faces costs 
for compensation and decontamination estimated at $120 billion – or two per cent of 
Japan’s gross domestic product. (Adapted from BBC, 2012; Radford, 2012; Willacy, 
2013.) 
 
The global financial crisis (GFC) and the Fukushima disaster are recent illustrations of how the 
failure to manage risks effectively can have catastrophic consequences. They bear witness to what has 
become known as the “risk society” – a society increasingly preoccupied with identifying and 
managing risks that it has itself produced (Beck, 2006: 332). This does not necessarily imply a world 
that is inherently more hazardous but, rather, a world that we attempt to control through the discourse 
of risk rather than through appeals to divine provenance or cosmic fate (Giddens, 1999a, 1999b; 
Lupton, 1999). Risk is commonly understood to be the probability of an adverse event of some 
magnitude – a danger of some kind that can be managed if the chances of it occurring and the 
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magnitude of its effects, if it does occur, can be accurately assessed (Danley, 2005). Even when risk is 
seen in a positive light, in terms of taking bold initiatives in anticipation of returns under conditions of 
uncertainty, the intention is to avoid negative outcomes, or at least reduce them to some acceptable 
level (Douglas, 1992; Fox, 1999; Gephart, Van Maanen & Oberlechner 2009).  
Organizations are deeply implicated in risk: it is predominantly in and through organizations 
that risks are produced, evaluated and managed (Gephart et al., 2009; Hutter & Power, 2005; Power, 
Scheytt, Soin & Sahlin, 2009). Organizations expose employees and other stakeholders to various 
forms of financial, environmental and health risks (Edwards, Ram & Smith, 2008); while themselves 
being exposed to regulatory, reputational and operational risks (Power, 2005; Scheytt, Soin, Sahlin-
Andersson & Power, 2006; Scott & Walshman, 2005; Smallman, 1996). Accordingly, identifying risks 
and ascertaining how to deal with them have become central to contemporary organizing.  
Organizational research is, however, limited in its ability to explain how organizations do and 
should deal with risk because it fails to address the complexity of risk in two important ways. First, 
with few exceptions (e.g., Gephart et al., 2009; Maguire & Hardy, 2013), organizational researchers 
have not explored the implications of organizations being situated in a dominant discourse of risk. 
Research that fails to consider the effects of this dominant discourse cannot explain why risk is 
organized in particular, common ways or why it may be difficult to change those ways even when they 
are ineffective. Second, for the most part, existing work on risk has developed in three separate 
streams, each of which focuses on a single way – or mode – of organizing risk. However, organizations 
face different challenges, depending on whether the aim is to manage risks that may develop in the 
future, are materializing in real-time, or have arisen in the past. Research that concentrates on a single 
mode has an incomplete view of how organizations deal with risk and is also unable to explain 
connections among the different modes. 
In this paper, we address these issues. We draw on the work of Foucault (1978; 1979; 1980; 
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2003), which allows us to characterize a dominant discourse of risk, investigate its effects on how risk 
is organized, and show how this discourse shapes and constrains the organizing of risk, leading 
organizations to normalize risk in specific ways. We also combine different streams of literature to 
identify three different modes for organizing risk, all of which are situated within this discourse. The 
first mode is the prospective organizing of risk through the use of formal assessment techniques that 
identify harms, hazards and dangers before they arise, with a view to avoiding or minimizing them 
through effective risk management. Organizations also struggle with imminent dangers when risks 
begin to materialize, often unexpectedly and unpredictably. A second mode for organizing risk 
therefore occurs in real-time, with the implementation of predetermined plans, scripts and protocols to 
control risk incidents and contain their consequences. Finally, risk is organized retrospectively with a 
view to improving how it will be organized in the future. In this mode, inquiries, hearings, reviews and 
other forms of post-hoc deliberation are used to analyze single or multiple incidents where risks have 
(or have almost) materialized. 
We develop an integrated framework by using Foucauldian concepts to link the three modes. 
We show how all three modes for organizing risk are situated within the dominant discourse of risk, 
which leads organizations to normalize risk in particular common and widespread ways in each of the 
three modes. We argue that the effectiveness of these widely accepted ways of organizing risk is, 
however, likely to be limited in certain circumstances, namely when addressing unfamiliar and 
systemic risks prospectively, when dealing in real-time with risks that are materializing unexpectedly, 
and when retrospectively reviewing risk incidents with the aim of making significant changes to how 
risks will be organized in the future. We therefore propose how organizing risk in alternative ways 
might address these situations more effectively. However, we acknowledge that enacting these 
alternative ways of organizing risk requires resisting the dominant discourse of risk, which is difficult 
in all three modes because the power relations associated with this discourse privilege certain forms of 
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knowledge and authorize certain risk identities over others. We consider further the difficulties of 
resisting this dominant discourse of risk by elaborating a ‘second order’ of critique that draws on 
Foucault’s concepts of intensification, discipline, and governmentality. Specifically, we argue that, 
even if organizations are able to overcome the difficulties associated with resisting the dominant 
discourse of risk and are successful in enacting alternative ways of organizing risk, this dominant 
discourse will continue to privilege certain forms of knowledge and identities in each mode. As a 
result, resistance may, ironically, contribute to greater ‘riskification’ (Heller, 2002) as more and more 
organizing is carried out in the name of risk.  
THE DOMINANT DISCOURSE OF RISK  
In recent decades, the language of ‘risk’ – terms that include risky, risk-free, high risk, risk 
appetite, risk averse, acceptable risk, etc. – have become commonplace in both expert and popular 
ways of talking about domains as diverse as finance and insurance, medicine and health, environment 
and business. Similarly, the application of risk practices and techniques has become routine in dealing 
with a wide range of hazards – from Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) to mad cow disease, 
from the pesticide DDT to the chemical bisphenol A (BPA) found in polycarbonate baby bottles, from 
mortgage defaults to stock market volatility, from forest fires to earthquakes, and from consumer 
boycotts to operating accidents. As we explain in the remainder of this section, such examples are 
indicative of a dominant discourse of risk, which permeates contemporary society.  
Discourses are defined as collections of interrelated texts and practices “that systematically 
form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1979: 49). Collectively, these texts and practices 
provide a coherent way of representing people, events, ideas and things – one that is expressed and 
enacted across a range of different settings, and which rules in certain ways of talking and acting in 
relation to a topic and rules out others (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2004). Discourse is not, therefore, 
merely a means “of representing the world, but [also] of signifying the world, constituting and 
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constructing the world in meaning” (Fairclough, 1992: 64). Material and ideational phenomena are 
given meanings through the way in which they are included (or excluded), ordered and categorized. In 
this way, discourse brings into being “situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and 
relations between people and groups of people” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 258). In other words, 
discourses “do not just describe things; they do things” (Potter & Wetherell, 1987: 6).  
The discourse of risk is constituted by texts and practices that systematically bring ‘risk’, as an 
object of knowledge, into existence. Examples of texts include scientific articles in the journal Risk 
Analysis or the other 11 journals listed on the Society for Risk Analysis website, as well countless other 
scientific, engineering, medical, legal and environmental journals, textbooks on risk assessment and 
risk management, ISO risk management principles and guidelines, emergency preparedness handbooks, 
emergency procedure manuals, emergency preparedness checklists, aggregated risk data reports, 
accident reviews, inquiry reports, submissions to public hearings, compliance reports, actuarial reports, 
media stories, government legislation, annual reports, scientific and technical reports, etc. In addition, a 
myriad of practices are involved in organizing risk, such as the use of probability and statistical 
techniques, preparation of risk matrices, carrying out event tree/fault tree analysis, calculating risk-
benefit ratios, preparing emergency preparedness plans, filling in emergency preparedness checklists, 
rehearsing accident protocols, conducting emergency simulations, monitoring for early warnings, 
auditing, completing accident or incident reports, holding hearings, calling witnesses, drafting inquiry 
reports, processing data to update actuarial tables, etc. These interrelated texts and practices are the 
means by which we ‘know’ risk (see Table 1).  
[T]he discourses, strategies, practices and institutions around a phenomenon such as risk 
serve to bring it into being, to construct it as a phenomenon. It is argued that it is only 
through these discourses, strategies, practices and institutions that we come to know 
‘risk’. They produce ‘truths’ on risk that are then the basis for action (Lupton, 2013: 
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Kindle location 1536).  
– TABLE 1 NEAR HERE – !
A discourse is said to be dominant when the texts and practices that comprise it draw on one 
another in well-established ways to construct convergent and widely shared descriptions and 
explanations of phenomena (Phillips et al., 2004). A dominant discourse thus provides a clear language 
“for talking about a topic and … a particular kind of knowledge about a topic” (du Gay 1996: 43). It 
produces clear meanings about “who and what is ‘normal’, standard and acceptable, thereby 
institutionalizing practices and reproducing behaviour” (Hardy & Maguire, 2010: 1367) such that a 
particular view of ‘reality’ becomes reified and taken-for-granted (Maguire & Hardy, 2009). 
In the case of risk, the texts and practices described above draw on each other in well-
established ways, revolving around realist and objective assumptions (Gephart et al., 2009), to 
construct a convergent and widely shared meaning of risk as “a tangible by-product of natural and 
social processes [that] can be objectively mapped, measured, and controlled, at least to the extent that 
science permits” (Jasanoff, 1998: 94). Risk is thus commonly understood to be the probability of an 
adverse effect or negative event of some magnitude – a harm, hazard or danger of some kind – that can 
be managed if the likelihood of its occurrence and nature of its effects can be accurately assessed 
(Danley, 2005). Risk assessment – the process whereby the risk is identified – is understood as 
‘science’ i.e., it is evidence- and fact-based, and also value-free through the application of widely 
recognized and highly institutionalized procedures and techniques. Risk management, on the other 
hand, is understood to be ‘policy’ i.e., deciding what to do to avoid or reduce identified risks, which is 
necessarily values-based since it involves trade-offs between multiple objectives.  
A dominant discourse produces clearly defined, convergent bodies of knowledge (Foucault, 
1980). According to this view, knowledge is not ‘discovered’ but, rather, is produced by those 
constructed as authoritative figures, and as a result of conforming to accepted procedures and protocols 
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(Ainsworth & Hardy, 2012). Knowledge is always contingent upon the discourses prevailing in the 
context in which it is situated – these discourses not only produce particular kinds of knowledge, they 
also establish various, institutionalized mechanisms that establish the basis for determining which 
statements count as true or false (Knights, 1992; Townley, 1993). Foucault refers to these mechanisms 
as ‘regimes of truth’.  
Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general’ politics of truth: that is, the type of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned; and the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; 
the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault, 1980: 
131). 
In the case of the dominant discourse of risk, texts and practices come together to produce a very clear, 
body of risk knowledge predicated on the rational analysis of experts.  
[Risk knowledge] emphasizes the role of professional languages (such as quantitative 
risk assessment) and analytic practices (such as cost-benefit analysis) in shaping public 
perceptions of risk. Authoritative knowledge is created in this framework by people or 
institutions that master the relevant formal discourses (Jasanoff, 1998: 94). 
This body of knowledge assumes that risk is ‘true’ insofar as its existence can be determined, 
accurately and objectively, through the application of scientific knowledge derived from the past in 
highly institutionalized ways, such as the employment of scientific measurement and analytical 
reasoning, and the application of specific, widely accepted risk analysis and measurement techniques 
(Knights & Vurdubakis, 2003; Lupton, 2013). 
Discourses also create certain categories of identity as meaningful and legitimate. Only those 
individuals who can take up these identities are able to speak and act, and not all individuals are able to 
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take up all identities (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004). Within the dominant discourse of risk, key 
categories of identity include: risk assessors who determine the nature, level and probability of harm, 
damage or loss; risk managers who are responsible for reducing risk to some level deemed acceptable; 
risk producers whose actions potentially generate hazards or cause harms, damage or losses; and risk 
bearers who are harmed or bear damage or losses when hazards are realized. As our subsequent 
analysis shows, two other risk identities are also produced by this dominant discourse: risk arbiters who 
are responsible for overseeing responses to risk incidents as they unfold in real-time and who supervise 
the actions of front-line workers; and risk adjudicators, who review incidents where risks have (or have 
almost) materialized to determine, after the fact, who produced the risk and who bore it, as well as who 
should have assessed or managed it more effectively.  
The dominant discourse, by representing individuals, objects and activities in particular ways, 
allows certain actors (i.e., those who are capable of taking up particular risk identities) to construct 
what constitutes a risk, and to decide how to avoid or manage it by calculating the nature, extent and 
likelihood of possible hazards under different scenarios (Dean, 1999; Lupton, 2013). By “determining 
the ‘real’ probability of an adverse event multiplied by the true magnitude and severity of 
consequences,” risk becomes “identifiable through scientific measurement and calculation, and [can] 
be controlled using such knowledge” (Gephart et al., 2009: 143). The dominant discourse of risk thus 
revolves around normalizing risk – rendering unpredictable and uncontrollable hazards into, knowable 
and manageable risks (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1999a; Lupton, 2013).  
Discourse, Power and Resistance 
Power relations are established, implemented and consolidated through discourse and the 
meanings it creates.  
To the extent that meanings become fixed or reified in certain forms, which then 
articulate particular practices, agents and relations, this fixity is power. Power is the 
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apparent order of taken-for granted categories of existence, as they are fixed and 
represented in a myriad of discursive forms and practices (Clegg 1989: 183). 
The dominant discourse of risk is thus an instrument and effect of power. In talking about power in this 
way, we are not referring to a relationship where one actor possesses control over or is less dependent 
upon another, or where outcomes are attributable to individual actors using resources intentionally, 
strategically and advantageously. Instead, we conceptualize a web of power relations that enables and 
constrains all actors, albeit unequally and in different ways.  
Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather something which only 
functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody’s 
hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and 
exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between 
its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising 
this power (Foucault, 1980: 98). 
This does not mean that actors do not intervene in attempts to bring about particular outcomes but, 
rather, that outcomes cannot be attributed in a straightforward way to the actions of particular actors, 
even elite ones, since no actor can completely escape the discourse of risk that orients and regulates 
their activities. A discourse is thus more than a “way of seeing” – its power effects are such that it 
reproduces “that way of seeing as the ‘truth,’” making it difficult to conceive of and enact alternatives 
(Knights & Morgan, 1991: 253).  
This is not to say that discourses – even dominant ones – are completely deterministic and 
totalizing. There is always scope for resistance. As Foucault (1978: 100-101) points out, discourse is 
not only a point through which power circulates; it is also “a point of resistance and a starting point for 
an opposing strategy”. Discourses – even dominant ones – are never completely cohesive; they are 
“partial, often crosscut by inconsistencies and contradiction, and almost always contested to some 
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degree” (Hardy & Phillips, 2004: 304). In addition, actors are positioned in multiple discourses, 
including grand, muscular ‘big D’ Discourses, such as the dominant discourse of risk on which we 
focus, but also other more localized ‘little d’ discourses e.g., conversations inside an organization about 
specific risks to valued outcomes such as the on-time and on-budget completion of a certain project 
(Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; also see Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004). Multiple discourses allow actors to 
play off one discourse against another or draw on multiple discourses to create new meanings, which 
can have important local effects, even if such resistance does not completely replace the dominant 
discourse (Hardy & Thomas, 2013). In the following section, we examine how the dominant discourse 
shapes the organizing of risk in each of the three modes, as well as the possibilities for resistance 
through alternative ways of organizing risk. 
A FOUCAULDIAN FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE ORGANIZING OF RISK  
Organizations seek to organize specific risks but they do so under different circumstances: 
sometimes, the aim is to avoid or manage risks that are believed will develop in the future; sometimes, 
there is a need to deal with risks that are perceived to be materializing in real-time; and sometimes, 
organizations seek to review and learn from risk incidents that have arisen in the past. There may also 
be cases where organizations face all three circumstances over time (e.g., Gephart, 1993; Gephart & 
Pitter, 1993; Turner, 1976). By drawing from and linking three separate streams of organizational 
literature, we identify three modes for organizing risk – prospectively, in real-time, and retrospectively 
– which are situated in this dominant discourse of risk. In this section, we theorize the way in which 
risk is most likely to be organized in each mode as a result of the dominant discourse. We postulate that 
although common, these ways of organizing risk are limited in their ability to deal with risks that 
appear unfamiliar and systemic; risks that seem to materialize in unexpected ways; or where there is a 
desire for significant changes in the future organizing of risk. We therefore propose an alternative way 
of organizing in each mode, which, we argue, is more likely to be more effective in addressing these 
13 
 
limitations, although it is difficult to enact because of the way the dominant discourse of risk privileges 
certain forms of knowledge and authorizes particular identities over others.  
Organizing Risks Prospectively  
The traditional literature on risk analysis assumes the existence of risks that must be identified 
and managed. It theorizes and develops risk assessment and management techniques that are intended 
to identify the likelihood that events with negative effects will arise in the future, predict the nature and 
magnitude of these effects, and ascertain the appropriate way to address them. It emphasizes the 
prospective organizing of risk – anticipating future adverse events so that actions can be taken to avoid 
or manage them – and is closely associated with the dominant discourse of risk. 
Risk is conceptualized in probabilistic terms that, with the help of hypothesis testing, 
forecasting, scenario analyses and actuarial science, provide the basis for calculative, rational decisions 
on risk (Miller, 2009).  
The traditional technical foundation of risk management is risk analysis, a discipline 
whose strength consists in its machine-like, engineering quality. Standard conceptions of 
risk analysis focus on identifying, measuring and evaluating possible outcomes from 
both natural and technological hazards (Hutter & Power, 2005: 7).  
It is this process of measurement and quantification that normalizes unpredictable hazards by turning 
them into predictable risks through sophisticated quantitative modelling. This “mathematizing” of risk 
(MacKenzie, 2005) dominates the finance and insurance industries, where risk is measured with a view 
to maximizing gains through the myriad of financial risk management techniques that have grown out 
of the Black–Scholes–Merton model (Millo & MacKenzie, 2009). It underpins such techniques as 
enterprise resource management (Power, 2007), the COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission) framework (Power, 2009), and Basel II/III (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006).  
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The prospective mode for organizing risk also features in the case of health and environmental 
risks (Heimer, Petty & Culyha, 2005). Normal science and the scientific method are used by 
government agencies, such as the US Environmental Protection Agency and the European Chemicals 
Agency, to assess whether chemicals are likely to damage human health or the environment in 
unacceptable ways, and to regulate the firms that produce and use these chemicals accordingly. A 
similar approach underpins the regulatory governance of other hazard-producing industries, such as 
nuclear power, mining, and transportation, where government agencies stipulate standards to which 
organizations should conform, based on measurement, specification, and auditing (Hutter, 2011), by 
drawing on technical risk-based tools developed from economics and the natural sciences (Lloyd-
Bostock & Hutter, 2008). In the case of large infrastructure projects (e.g. the construction of oil and gas 
pipelines), practices of holding hearings and preparing environmental risk assessment documents prior 
to project commencement are also used to organize risks prospectively. 
The prospective mode appears to emphasize the future i.e., predicting and preventing (or at least 
minimizing) risk in attempts to influence what may happen. However, it does so by extrapolating from 
the past – abstracting from the sum total of what is known from the past involving the risk in question. 
This past is empirical in that it results from scientific experiments, epidemiology studies, aggregated 
data about the frequency of extreme weather events, financial analyses, an organization’s historical 
data on supply chain interruptions, studies of machinery breakdowns, etc. This knowledge is then 
abstracted into regularities, such as ‘facts’, correlations, causal relationships, models, formulae and 
laws, which are then applied to a hypothetical future in which the risk is implicated. The aim is to avoid 
this future if possible, by ensuring the risk does not arise; or to be ready to manage it through the 
preparation of plans, scripts and protocols in the event that it does. 
When risk is organized prospectively, the various risk identities are relatively clear and distinct, 
and the relations among them well institutionalized. Typically, risk assessors – scientific, technical or 
15 
 
organizational experts – produce knowledge concerning the likelihood that some actors (risk producers) 
may cause adverse events that lead to harm to other actors (risk bearers). The prospective organizing of 
risk is typically mediated and decontextualized. Risk is assessed prior to when, and away from where, 
it might materialize i.e., in scientific laboratories, actuarial firms, and various types of safety or risk 
management departments that are separated from the sites where adverse effects might occur. On the 
basis of the knowledge produced by risk assessors, risk managers – who may be managers inside the 
organization or regulators in government – authorize and sanction action to restrict or reduce the 
activities of risk producers in order to protect the risk bearers, which might be the general public, 
individuals working in the organization, or the organization itself. Not all these risk identities are 
equally accessible, however, with the result that high status professionals such as scientists, financial 
analysts and other experts retain control of the identification of risk (Jasanoff, 1998).  
The expert, technical/scientific, and universalistic body of knowledge produced by risk 
assessors is inseparable from the prospective organizing of risk.  
What is important about risk is not risk itself, but the forms of knowledge that make it 
thinkable from statistics, sociology and epidemiology to management and accounting, 
the techniques that discover it from the calculus of probabilities to the interview, the 
social technologies that seek to govern it from risk screening, case-management and 
social insurance to situational crime prevention (Dean, 1999: 131-2). 
This knowledge is assumed to be authoritative, unbiased, reliable and complete, thereby producing 
confidence in its ability to accurately identify the likelihood and magnitude of negative events. In 
contrast, lay knowledge is framed as politicized and irrational. Whereas experts are understood to 
produce ‘assessments’ of risks, lay people are understood to have mere ‘perceptions’ of risk – a 
distortion of ‘actual’ risk as defined by experts (Gephart, et al., 2009; Jasanoff, 1998). Lay knowledge 
is ‘subjective’, whereas expert technical knowledge is assumed to be objective, even though by 
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identifying and measuring risks, technical experts actively construct them through the particular 
methods and techniques they use (Feldman, 2004).  
To summarize, our argument is that, as a result of the dominant discourse of risk, the most 
common way of organizing risk prospectively is through the production of expert risk knowledge 
derived from empirical information about the past, which has been abstracted into regularities in the 
form of facts, correlations and causal models, and applied to a hypothetical future by risk assessors. 
This knowledge then forms the basis of actions taken by risk managers to protect risk bearers and 
restrict risk producers. 
 Even though this way of organizing risk prospectively may deal well with familiar, specific 
risks, it can never fully predict and control all possible future hazards (Beck, 1992; Crook, 2011; Dean, 
1999; Elliott, 2002). Organizations face complexity (cause and effect are hard to determine); ambiguity 
(different interpretations arise from the same data); and ignorance (what is not known is not known) 
about what may or may not constitute a risk (e.g., Renn, 2003; Wynne, 1992). Not all hazards are 
amenable to quantification and prediction. Some are too complex to “fit into a traditional linear 
problem-solving model” (Etkin & Ho, 2007: 623). Ambiguity regarding the costs of risky behaviour 
also undermines a rational approach to risk (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Guillén & Suárez, 2010). There 
are, as a result, particular difficulties in dealing with new, unfamiliar risks where it is unclear what the 
hazards are, let alone how to calculate their likelihood (Beck, 1992). In such situations, information is 
unavailable, uncertain and/or ambiguous as, for example, with genetically modified organisms. 
Similarly with systemic risks, information is complex, contingent and contradictory. There are 
countless permutations, possibilities, feedback loops and complications, which cannot be meaningfully 
reduced to discrete predictions as, for example, with the GFC.  
In such cases, we suggest that is important to problematize traditional risk knowledge drawn 
from the past by drawing attention to discontinuity and uncertainty in knowledge about risks, rather 
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than accepting existing models, the extant scientific literature, and the dominance of expert knowledge 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2013). Problematizing involves questioning the nature of the “existing attention to 
risk and its model of identification, recognition and definition” (Hutter & Power, 2005: 11). It also 
involves questioning the hierarchy of relations among distinct risk identities. This means challenging 
the privileged position of risk assessors in producing risk knowledge by drawing on alternative 
discourses such as participation, deliberation, and precaution to include more stakeholders, increase 
public involvement and introduce lay knowledge (Stirling, 2008). Thus, the singularity and 
distinctiveness of risk identities breaks down in the case of unfamiliar and systemic risks, where it is 
not always obvious whose actions may cause harm or to whom, who should participate in ascertaining 
harms or deliberating their acceptability, or on whose behalf risks are to be managed. For example, in 
the GFC, risk assessors and managers were also risk producers – part of the problem, although not 
recognized as such at the time – and became risk bearers as their institutions collapsed; the absence of 
expert knowledge to identify the financial risks called the identity of ‘expert’ risk assessor into 
question; and many risk managers were compromised as they focused on individual institutions at the 
expense of both the wider financial systems and customers who did not understand the financial 
products they bought. Treating actors as clearly falling into distinct, fixed categories of risk identity 
when the situation is complex, fluid and equivocal, makes it difficult to comprehend and address 
unfamiliar and systemic risks. 
We therefore propose that the prospective organizing of risk is better able to deal with 
unfamiliar and systemic risks when it problematizes existing expert risk knowledge and the ability of 
the past to predict the future, incorporates lay knowledge produced by risk bearers and other risk 
identities, and challenges the hierarchy of risk identities. However, enacting this alternative way of 
organizing risk prospectively is difficult because the dominant discourse of risk privileges expert risk 
knowledge in the form of facts, correlations and causal models over other forms of knowledge, and 
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authorizes risk assessors to produce it and risk managers to act on it over other risk identities.  
Organizing Risks in Real-Time 
The literature on how organizations respond to accidents, disasters and crises, and on how high 
reliability organizations try to avoid them, provides insight into a second mode for organizing risk, 
which is employed when risks are believed to be materializing and have to be organized in real-time. 
Examples include the case of  ‘mad cow’ disease (Pidgeon, Kasperson & Slovic, 2003), the Challenger 
and Columbia disasters (Feldman, 2004), Three Mile Island (Hopkins, 2001), Deepwater Horizon 
(Hopkins, 2011), Mann Gulch (Weick, 1993), and 9/11 (Hood, 2005) to name but a few; not to mention 
numerous accidents in coalmines, nuclear plants, airlines, aircraft carriers, oil rigs, nuclear submarines, 
etc. (e.g., Heimann, 2005; Hopkins, 1999; Perin, 2005; Perrow, 1999; Sauer, 2003; Vaughan, 2005). In 
these situations, materializing risks are typically normalized through the implementation of plans, 
scripts and protocols (produced previously through the prospective organizing of risk) within and 
across organizations. Risk knowledge derived from technical, empirical information and past 
experience has been abstracted by experts into regularities, to be applied by other individuals at a 
specific point in time in the event that a risk does begin to materialize. By anticipating the pattern of 
materialization, these plans, scripts and protocols act as risk-management tools and are intended to 
control and contain risks as they emerge.  
The real-time organizing of risk involves implementing a range of pre-determined response 
mechanisms triggered by metrics, thresholds and heuristics, as well as instituting various forms of 
communication and coordination among those involved in responding to the risk. These practices are 
intended to control the unfolding of adverse events and contain their damage through the application of 
elaborate and clearly defined rules, detailed and well documented operating procedures, as well as a 
clear-cut, chain-of-command authority (Hood, 2005). For example, when SARS hit Toronto, Canada in 
2003, the Premier of Ontario declared a provincial health emergency, which triggered specific routines 
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inside and across numerous organizations. “A Provincial Operations Centre (POC) and a Scientific 
Advisory Group were established, both of which included representatives from the province, Toronto 
Public Health (TPH) and other health facilities. The POC issued a wide range of directives to hospitals 
and other institutions, establishing stringent infection control requirements. Hand washing and 
symptom screening were instituted for anyone entering a health facility, and staff and visitors were 
required to wear gloves, gowns and masks in patient care areas” (Basrur, 2003). A similar, 
predetermined “command structure” was put in place inside the hospitals as “infection control 
procedures took precedence over almost all other aspects of hospital function”: directives were issued, 
physical access to hospitals was restricted, and non-essential workers and visitors were told to stay at 
home (Maunder, 2004: 1118).  
During the process of a risk materializing, developments are carefully monitored and evaluated 
by risk ‘arbiters’, who could be senior risk managers, compliance officers or oversight panels inside the 
organization; or emergency and security experts or coordinating committees from outside the 
organization. These actors are responsible for overseeing responses when risk incidents are unfolding, 
and ensuring compliance with pre-determined plans, scripts and protocols, or determining and 
authorizing adjustments. The role of risk arbiters is to engage in prepared routines of monitoring the 
risk as it materializes and to decide which responses are to be deployed by front-line workers. There is 
an emphasis on top-down command and control protocols, where successive hierarchical levels or 
external agencies cross-check attempts to contain the risk, monitor progress, coordinate actions, and 
give approval for changes in routines as the risk is deemed to worsen or diminish (e.g., Bigley & 
Roberts, 2001; Leveson et al., 2009; Roberts, 1990). So, for example, in the ‘three lines of defence’ 
used in many banks to manage financial risks, front-line employees are overseen on an ongoing basis 
by a ‘second line’ of defence made up of employees in risk management, finance and human resources 
(Trundle, 2012). Responses to an outbreak of ‘foot and mouth’ disease in cattle in the UK in 2007 were 
20 
 
directed by the Cabinet Office Briefing Room, the Government’s central crisis management committee, 
which had ultimate authority for handling the risks nationally. Other risk arbiters during the outbreak 
included the Chief Veterinary Officer and a series of Regional Operations Directors who dealt with 
operational risks and oversaw regional responses, passing information up the line and instructions 
down the line, in accordance with the contingency plan (Anderson, 2008).  
The real-time organizing of risk is similar to the prospective organizing of risk in that it also 
involves extrapolating from the past. However, in this case, past knowledge is deployed to manage the 
present i.e., as what may happen becomes what is happening. Whereas the prospective organizing of 
risk revolves around identifying risks that might materialize in a hypothetical future, in real-time these 
risks are materializing in the present. Technical, empirical knowledge about the type of risk, the 
characteristics of its materialization, and appropriate responses are built into plans, scripts and 
protocols developed by experts, which are subsequently implemented by those dealing directly with the 
materializing risk, under the oversight of risk arbiters. The expert knowledge built into plans, scripts 
and protocols specifies precise data to be collected and monitored by these local actors as when, for 
example, employees at a chemical manufacturing facility are required to monitor the temperature and 
pressure inside reactors and to intervene in specific ways if measures indicate that predetermined safety 
limits for these metrics have been breached.  
These local actors thus become responsible for concurrently assessing and managing risk at the 
same time as they are often also directly harmed if the risk is not controlled or contained. This is most 
evident in the case of accidents and disasters, as in the Fukushima disaster when TEPCO employees 
and emergency workers had to assess the risk of a meltdown and take measures to prevent it, while 
risking their own lives to do so; or in the case with SARS, where front line health workers in Ontario’s 
health care system had to deal with greater exposure to the virus. It can also be seen in situations where 
board members, executives, managers and employees are responsible for identifying and managing 
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legal, strategic, reputational and operational risks, at the same time as being subject to them. Many of 
those responsible for assessing and managing financial risks in the GFC also bore the risk of losing 
their jobs if they were not successful. Consequently, rather than risk assessors, managers, and bearers 
being clearly distinguished as is the case with the prospective mode, these risk identities are often 
blurred when risk is organized in real-time although, typically, this combined identity of risk assessor-
cum-manager-cum-bearer remains separate from and subordinate to risk arbiters.  
To summarize, our argument is that, as a result of the dominant discourse of risk, the most 
common way of organizing risk in real-time is through the implementation of expert risk knowledge 
derived from empirical information about the past, which has been abstracted into regularities in the 
form of plans, scripts and protocols. This knowledge then forms the basis of actions taken in a specific 
present by risk assessors-cum-managers-cum-bearers, subject to endorsement from risk arbiters. 
Even though plans may function well when risks materialize according to predetermined 
scenarios and trajectories, they are less effective when risks deviate from expectations, and when 
organizations face unknown or unexpected situations where the risks may not be self-evident. Under 
such circumstances, it may be important to problematize existing expert risk knowledge and question 
the ability of this past knowledge to deal with the present. A “generalizable set of practices and 
procedures” can never be fully and adequately formulated “prior to an understanding of material 
conditions in local environments” (Sauer, 2003: 182). Prepared plans only provide very general 
guidelines regarding some signs of pending hazards. In real-time, individuals experience these signs, 
but also other stimuli that may, or may not, be signals of danger. They must interpret the correct 
signals, ignore others, and adapt as circumstances dictate; and they must improvise to deal with 
circumstances not covered in existing plans and scripts (e.g., Ash & Smallman, 2008; Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010; Whiteman & Cooper, 2011). Consequently, even the best-laid plans will require 
contextualizing, customizing and adapting in real-time as the risk materializes and deviates in some 
22 
 
way from what was anticipated. 
Different forms of knowledge may be vital to risk assessors-cum-managers-cum-bearers in 
order to deal with risks that materialize in unexpected ways from those predicted in plans and scripts. 
In coal mining, for example, embodied, sensory knowledge is important. The ability to assess the risk 
of a shaft collapsing may owe a considerable amount to the ability to smell gases, spot cracks, and hear 
noises (Kamoche & Maguire, 2010). 
In the darkness of a mine, miners use all of their senses to see, hear and smell hazards 
around them … It exists in the ability of the human body to feel changes in pressure and 
to hear differences in sounds. Thus pops indicate the pressure of methane; bumps 
indicate yielding pillars. When timbers fail, miners hear cracks that warn them (Sauer, 
2003: 189). 
Such knowledge is relevant to all types of risk. One doesn’t have to be down a coalmine or in a nuclear 
energy facility for things to ‘feel’ wrong, for a balance sheet not to ‘look’ right; for conversations with 
employees to ‘sound’ like a strike is looming, or for a new business strategy to ‘seem’ problematic. Gut 
feel, hunches or intuitions, as well as emotions like unease or worry, and using all five senses may be 
vital to dealing with risks as they arise. Validating such knowledge, as well as the authority of people 
throughout the organization, at all levels, to produce and act on it, facilitates the ability of the 
organization to improvise and adapt when dealing with risks that materialize in unexpected ways.  
To make complex judgments concerning risk, especially under time pressure and in unexpected 
circumstances, risk assessors-cum-managers-cum-bearers may want to reject codified knowledge 
expressed in plans, scripts and protocols and to act on the basis of their tacit, sensory and embodied 
knowledge. However, the latter is often considered to be of dubious status and may not be accepted as a 
legitimate way to assess and manage risk, especially if it is at odds with the command and control 
protocols activated in in the event of an emergency or crisis (Perin, 2005). Research has shown that 
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individuals who draw on experiential – tacit, sensory, embodied – knowledge are often ignored by 
more senior managers – risk arbiters – when they point to particular danger signs or try to deviate from 
prescribed plans, scripts and protocols (Naevstad, 2008). Such knowledge is simply dismissed as ‘old 
wives tales’ (Kamoche & Maguire, 2010). Individuals may even abdicate their own responsibility for 
monitoring and dealing with risk because they believe that the general expertise of superiors is more 
relevant than their own situational knowledge (Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009). However, unless the status of 
the risk knowledge that risk assessors-cum-managers-cum-bearers produce and act upon is validated 
and unless they have discretion to also act as risk arbiters, their ability to adapt and improvise will be 
limited.  
We therefore propose that the real-time organizing risk is better able to deal with risks that 
materialize unpredictably and deviate from expected scenarios when it problematizes existing expert 
risk knowledge and the ability of the past to apply to the present, incorporates the experiential 
knowledge of locally situated risk assessors-cum-managers-cum-bearers, and challenges the hierarchy 
of risk identities. However, enacting this alternative way of organizing risk in real-time is difficult 
because the dominant discourse of risk privileges expert risk knowledge in the form of previously 
produced plans, scripts and protocols over other forms of knowledge, and authorizes risk arbiters over 
other risk identities.  
Organizing Risks Retrospectively 
The stream of organizational literature on public inquiries indicates a third mode in which risks 
are organized – retrospectively, ostensibly with a view to improving both the prospective and real-time 
organizing of risk. High profile events with significant negative effects, like the GFC and Fukushima, 
as well as ‘near misses’ often attract formal investigations after the fact (although this is not to deny 
that some incidents are ‘swept under the carpet’ and not reviewed). There is, as a result, a considerable 
amount of literature on public inquiries and hearings set up to investigate risks related to activities as 
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diverse as oil drilling (Brown, 2004), heatwaves (Boudes & Laroche, 2009), arms sales (Brown & 
Jones 2000), oil pipeline operations (Gephart, 1993), and meat production (Jasanoff, 2005); as well as 
on investigations by regulatory agencies, such as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 
inquiry into the Ford Pinto (Danley, 2005), the US Mine Safety and Health Administration’s 
examination of coal mining accidents (Madsen, 2009), and the UK’s General Medical Council 
investigations of health risks (Lloyd-Bostock & Hutter, 2008). 
Inquiries and reviews are not, however, held only in response to individual accidents and 
disasters; they are also established in relation to a wide range of economic and social problems that 
have come to be talked about in terms of risks. Thus the risks associated with, for example, 
demographic shifts (e.g., inquiries on the aging population and the risk of unemployment of elderly 
workers), social issues (e.g., reviews of early childhood development services and the risk of criminal 
behaviour by young offenders), mental and medical health concerns (e.g., inquiries into gambling and 
the risk of addiction), and economic matters (e.g., reviews of government entitlement programs and the 
risk of their insolvency) are organized retrospectively by governments through various forms of 
inquiry. Finally, although the subject of far less research, organizations conduct their own internal 
reviews by investigating risk incidents (and ‘near misses’). Organizations also draw on routines to 
organize risk retrospectively, such as regularly scheduled internal audits, as in the ‘third line’ of 
defence in banks, where internal and external auditors review transactions after the fact to establish 
whether financial risks have been handled appropriately (Trundle, 2012). In all these examples, past 
events and behaviours are reviewed in order to organize risk retrospectively i.e., to ascertain what 
happened in the past and whether there is a need for change in the future.  
In the retrospective mode for organizing risk, various forms of deliberation – from formal 
inquiries to ad hoc, internal reviews – are intended to produce new expert risk knowledge, i.e. a 
holistic, convergent account of what happened, coupled with lessons and recommendations for 
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improving risk assessment and management in the future. In reviewing previous incidents in order to 
improve how risk is organized in the future, the retrospective organizing of risk is typically mediated 
and decontextualized: events, actions and timelines are reconstructed afterwards by, and including the 
views of, actors not directly involved in the incident under examination. For example, public inquiries 
rely heavily on expert knowledge (Aitken, 2009) and are characterized by a culture of regulatory 
science (Goven, 2006), which uses “precise measurement of the hazards as a basis for initiating rule 
governed actions” to control them (Gephart, 1997: 583). Independent professionals, who typically were 
not directly involved in the incident, are called upon to give their opinions based on their expert 
knowledge of the risk in question. Witnesses directly involved in trying to manage the risk 
prospectively or in real-time also recount their partial, situated experiences of the incident, which are 
then aggregated, although research has found that such subjective, anecdotal knowledge is typically 
subordinated to expert knowledge (e.g., Ainsworth & Hardy, 2012; Gephart, 1997). In the case of 
internal reviews, experts might be called in from other departments inside the organization e.g., from 
the accounting department to conduct a forensic audit or from the safety department to investigate 
workplace risks. Various analytical procedures based on expert risk knowledge are used (e.g., to 
compare performance at different points in time, different business units with one another, or the 
organization against benchmarked targets), coupled with subjective evidence gained through 
discussions and interviews with employees (e.g., Vasudevan, 2004).  
The retrospective organizing of risk involves investigating the roles played by various 
individuals to identify those actors who failed to assess or manage it satisfactorily, and those actors 
who were harmed as a consequence (Gephart, 1984; Gephart, Steier & Lawrence, 1990; Hutter, 2005). 
The concept of risk acts as a ‘forensic resource’ with which to hold persons accountable and attribute 
blame (Douglas, 1990). As a result of this process, risk ‘adjudicators’ – who could be panel members in 
the case of a public inquiry or senior managers in the organization in an internal review – assign risk 
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identities and evaluate their actions. These risk adjudicators determine who produced the risk and who 
bore it, as well as who should have assessed or managed it more effectively. Causality is inferred, 
actors’ roles are assigned, and praise and blame are distributed (Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Brown, 
2000; Winch & Maytorena, 2009).  
Typically, a single, coherent narrative is constructed by the risk adjudicator of what did happen 
by aggregating and abstracting the partial knowledge of various participants in the hearing or review 
into a holistic account of the past – one that makes sense to diverse stakeholders, ameliorates anxiety 
by explaining how and why the negative event occurred, and attributes responsibility (Gephart, 1993; 
2007). In this way, the retrospective mode normalizes risk through the construction of a holistic, 
convergent, authoritative account, which is then abstracted into regularities in the form of lessons and 
recommendations that are applied to a hypothetical future, by recommending what should happen i.e., 
what risk assessors, managers, producers and bearers should do to deal with risk if similar 
circumstances arise. 
To summarize, our argument is that, as a result of the dominant discourse of risk, the most 
common way of organizing risk retrospectively is through the production of expert risk knowledge 
derived from empirical information about the past, which has been abstracted into regularities in the 
form of a holistic, convergent account containing lessons and recommendations by risk adjudicators. 
This knowledge then forms the basis of actions to be taken in the future by other risk identities. 
Even though the retrospective organizing of risk can lead to recommendations for improving 
the organizing of risk in the future, these recommendations typically fail to bring about significant 
change (e.g., Brown, 2004; Boudes & Laroche, 2009). As, for example, the GFC shows, despite 
previous experience, past same mistakes are often repeated:  
Before the 2008 subprime U.S. mortgage crisis, there was the 1988 savings and loan 
crisis. Whether rare events are costly or beneficial, looking back we are often surprised 
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at the failure of organizations to draw appropriate lessons (Lampel, Shamsie & Shapira, 
2009: 835). 
One reason for this is that inquiries, hearings and reviews are typically established by elite actors 
associated with privileged economic and administrative interests, often with narrow terms of reference 
that reduce the scope of investigation (Kendra, 2007). In adjudicating not only on what did happen but 
also on what should have happened, counterfactual reasoning is required – a type of reasoning that is 
inevitably compromised by the cognitive styles and ideological biases of elites (Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock 
& Lebow, 2001). The narratives produced are therefore more likely to call for the restoration of 
existing systems, albeit with some minor amendments, than for a fundamental overhaul of them 
(Brown, 2004; Kendra, 2007; Topal, 2009) as when, for example, risks are attributed to individuals 
such as rogue traders instead of financial systems (e.g., Wexler, 2010); to managerially incompetent 
doctors rather than the medical profession as a whole (Brown, 2000); or to individual bureaucrats but 
not the health system as a whole (Boudes & Laroche, 2009).  
Another reason why the holistic accounts of the past that are crafted in inquiries and reviews 
often fail to provide a basis for significant change is because they are ‘notional’ i.e., it would have been 
impossible for any individual to have such an all-encompassing account of the risk at the time. Such 
knowledge can only exist as a result of aggregating partial accounts. For example, to claim that 
warning signals were ignored misses the point that they may have seemed irrelevant in real-time.   
Warning signals [exist] only in hindsight. Before the accident takes place, it is hardly 
clear what these signals mean. Besides, there are often dozens of different signals, which 
cannot all be attended to simultaneously. It is extremely difficult to discriminate the real 
signals amongst the heap of noise and false warnings (Rijpma, 2003: 41). 
Individuals only ever have a partial view of risk – “a situated but incomplete view of the whole” 
(Sauer, 2003; 227). There is, then, no single coherent narrative available to actors who must identify it 
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prospectively or deal with it in real time. Such accounts can only ever be constructed retrospectively by 
bringing a range of individuals together and, through the process of writing and revising a written 
report about the past with the benefit of time and hindsight, diverse, partial and/or contradictory views 
together into a convergent narrative. Problematizing existing expert risk knowledge and the ability of a 
holistic, convergent account of the past to add usefully to it therefore means recognizing that 
understandings of risk constructed after its materialization can never be the same as those constructed 
prior to or during its materialization. 
Changing how risk is organized in the future to incorporate knowledge that is multiple, partial 
and contradictory requires ‘experience heterogeneity’ (Zollo, 2009), and the development of multi-
causal explanations rather than identifying a single culprit or cause (Morath & Leary, 2004). The use of 
multiple, partial, situated accounts as the basis for new risk knowledge, rather than singular 
homogenized, collective accounts, is more consistent with individuals’ experience of risk in the future 
(i.e., incomplete and equivocal), rendering recommendations for change more meaningful and more 
practical. As a result, some forms of inquiry such as truth and reconciliation commissions, have not 
necessarily tried to identify a single truth of what happened. Rather, they have tried to discern the many 
truths of what happened by acknowledging that there is factual truth based on impartial and objective 
evidence, personal truth in the form of individuals’ stories, and social truth constructed through 
discussion and debate (Rushton, 2006).  
Reviews and inquiries are sometimes able to avoid the typical naming, shaming and blaming by 
risk adjudicators and the assignation of perpetrators (risk producers, inadequate risk assessors, 
inadequate risk managers) and victims (risk bearers), as well as be more sceptical of so-called experts.  
Recommendations may be more likely to result in significant change in the future organizing of risk if 
they are predicated on the assumption that expert knowledge is fallible and alternative forms of 
knowledge are valid; and if they recognize that the power relations among risk producers, assessors, 
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managers and bearers stemming from the dominant discourse of risk are, themselves, implicated in the 
problems that the inquiry or review is ostensibly trying to solve. In this way, the foundation can be laid 
for the inclusion of alternative forms of lay knowledge in the prospective organizing of risk and the 
experiential, tacit knowledge of risk assessor-cum-manager-cum-bearers in the real-time organizing of 
risk. However, reconstructing risk identities in these complex and nuanced ways and rejecting holistic 
accounts is difficult since it involves challenging the authority of risk adjudicators, as well as the 
prevailing scientific/technical paradigm through which they, as well as experts, construct the specific 
risk in question.  
We therefore propose that the retrospective organizing of risk is more likely to bring about 
significant changes in the future organizing of risk when it problematizes existing expert risk 
knowledge and the ability of a holistic, convergent account of the past to add usefully to it, incorporates 
partial experiential knowledge in the form of multiple, contradictory accounts, and challenges the 
hierarchy of risk identities. However, enacting this alternative way of organizing risk retrospectively is 
difficult because the dominant discourse of risk privileges expert risk knowledge in the form of a 
holistic, convergent account containing lessons and recommendations, and authorizes risk adjudicators 
over other risk identities.   
Integrating the Modes: A Foucauldian Framework 
In the section above, we have identified and linked three different modes for organizing risk, 
drawing on Foucauldian concepts, to provide an integrated framework (Table 2). The framework 
highlights how the dominant discourse of risk shapes organizing in all three modes, not only by 
increasing the tendency to organize risk through processes that are normalizing, but also by rendering 
these processes ‘normal’. The forms of risk knowledge and relations among risk identities associated 
with the common way of organizing in each mode are assumed to comprise a neutral, objective, 
rational and effective way to organize risk to the extent that they are taken for granted. Deviations from 
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them are viewed as arbitrary, idiosyncratic and politicized.  Hence, even though the alternative ways of 
organizing risk may deal more effectively with certain situations, it is difficult for organizations to 
enact them because it requires resisting the dominant discourse of risk.  
– TABLE 2 NEAR HERE –  
It is important to note that we present three distinct modes for analytical purposes only. 
Organizations may move through more than one mode. For example, both the GFC and Fukushima 
provide evidence of failures in the prospective organizing of risk, which led to financial and physical 
risks materializing which then had to be organized in real-time with varying degrees of success. As a 
result of failures in both prospective and real-time organizing of risk in both cases, major inquiries 
were held to organize risk retrospectively. In neither case does the retrospective organizing of risk 
appear to have led to any fundamental changes in how such risks are managed: the US is now “even 
more concentrated in the hands of a few large, systemically significant institutions” (FCIC, 2011: 
xxvii); while, nuclear power seems firmly on Japan’s agenda despite the potential risks (Tabuchi, 
2012).  Thus we have a clear indication that all three modes may be involved – and may overlap – in 
the organizing of some risks.  
It also important to note that the three modes for organizing risk occur both within individual 
organizations and across multiple organizations. So, for example, safety risks to employees or 
customers are organized prospectively by individual organizations through the development of internal, 
organization-specific workplace and product design policies; and by government regulations that apply 
across organizations, and which have been developed through consultation with industry associations, 
professional bodies, unions and consumer groups. Individual organizations manage risks in real-time 
as, for example, Johnson & Johnson had to do in when the safety of its customers and its own 
reputation were threatened by cyanide being added to Tylenol capsules; and the real-time organizing of 
risk also crosses organizational boundaries, as is clear from such examples as the GFC, the Fukushima 
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disaster, the SARS epidemic and 9/11. Risks are organized retrospectively within individual 
organizations through various forms of post-incident investigation, such as safety reviews, performance 
appraisals, and forensic audits; as well as across multiple organizations through public inquiries and 
hearings that bring diverse stakeholders together.  
RESISTANCE AND RISKIFICATION  
In this section, we continue with our Foucauldian analysis to explore further the profound 
impacts of the dominant discourse of risk on the three modes. We have already argued that enacting 
alternative ways of organizing risk is difficult because of the power relations associated with this 
discourse. We show here how, even when risk is organized differently (i.e., problematizing occurs, 
alternative forms of knowledge are incorporated into organizing, and understandings of risk identities 
are successfully challenged), the dominant discourse of risk continues to privilege existing bodies of 
risk knowledge and identities. As a result, resistance can serve to reinforce the prevailing power 
relations instead of transforming or overthrowing them, thereby reproducing the dominant discourse of 
risk and even extending its reach. We use three key Foucauldian concepts – intensification (Foucault, 
1991; 2008), discipline (Foucault, 1979) and governmentality (Foucault, 2002; 2003) – to revisit each 
of the modes and to provide a ‘second order’ of critique by demonstrating how resistance may, 
ironically, contribute to greater ‘riskification’ (see Table 3). By riskification we refer to processes 
whereby risk becomes further entrenched as “the natural way to talk about a variety of concerns – not 
solely matters commonly associated with technical or physical ‘danger’ … [but also] arenas ranging 
from business investing and marital questions to career development and social work” (Heller, 2002: 
9). In other words, attempts to resist the dominant discourse of risk can lead to more and more 
organizing, across many more realms of social life, being carried out in the name of risk.  
– TABLE 3 NEAR HERE –  
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Intensification and the Prospective Organizing of Risk  
Intensification occurs as a discourse increases in efficiency, spread and saturation (Nealon, 
2008) i.e., its effects become greater as more and more categories of individuals, society and the natural 
world are targeted while, at the same time, these effects become less visible, more taken-for-granted, 
and less contentious (Hardy & Thomas, 2014). 
[Intensification means] firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost 
(economically, by the low expenditure it involves; politically, by its discretion, its low 
exteriorization, its relative invisibility, the little resistance it arouses); secondly, to bring 
the effects of this power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as far as 
possible without either failure or interval; thirdly, to link this ‘economic’ growth of 
power with the output of the apparatuses (educational, military, industrial or medical) 
within which it is exercised; in short to increase the docility and the utility of all the 
elements of the system (Foucault, 1979: 218).  
The tendency of dominant discourses to intensify means that, even when new forms of knowledge and 
new identities are opened up through countervailing discourses, this resistance can come to be 
subsumed by the dominant discourse. 
Intensification is clearly evident in the case of the dominant discourse of risk. As this discourse 
has become more pervasive and its effects more taken for granted, attempts to resist it are more likely 
to be subsumed by it, as a result of which they serve to reinforce it. For example, attempts to involve 
lay people and the general public in the discussion of technological risks to human health and the 
environment through deliberative democracy and participation have tended to require non-scientists to 
participate in scientific processes, such as when lay people are included in ‘extended peer reviews’ 
(Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). New identities have been constructed for the non-scientists, but as 
‘citizen scientists’ (Fisher, Mahajan & Mitcham, 2006) who produce ‘citizen-science’ (Backstrand, 
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2003). These new identities remain firmly embedded within the scientific model that underpins the 
dominant discourse of risk. Similarly, in the case of indigenous stewardship of natural resources – a 
countervailing discourse relevant to many environmental risks – aboriginal knowledge has been folded 
into traditional western conceptions of knowledge to become “simply a new form of ‘data’ to be 
incorporated into existing management bureaucracies and acted upon by scientists and resource 
managers” (Nadasdy, 2003: 369).  
Intensification effects can also arise when countervailing discourses are used to challenge the 
dominant discourse of risk. One such example is the discourse of precaution, which is based on the 
‘precautionary principle’ enshrined in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development. Precaution foregrounds the uncertainty and incompleteness of scientific knowledge 
about risks (Stirling 1999), and it rejects scientific uncertainty regarding adverse effects as a 
justification for inaction when managing risks. 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation (UNCED 
1992).  
This discourse emphasizes that the “absence of evidence of harm is not the same as evidence of 
absence of harm” (Stirling, 2010: 1030). Precaution thus allows for action in situations when adverse 
effects are uncertain and lowers the burden of proof in providing evidence of these effects before 
restrictions are implemented. It has been used to challenge the privileged status of existing expert risk 
knowledge and of the risk assessors and risk managers whose positions derive from it; and to give 
greater voice to risk bearers in relation to uncertain risks posed by chemical pollution (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2006), genetically modified organisms (Van den Belt & Gremmen, 2002), consumer products 
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(Maguire & Hardy, 2013) and financial services (Crotty & Epstein, 2009), to name but a few.  
The discourse of precaution appears to provide a way to resist the dominant discourse of risk 
insofar as it encourages action on potential harms, even in the absence of scientific facts. However, it 
still conceives of the future in terms of some form of a negative event that requires preventive action. 
The question then becomes: “how to act in the here and now before the full occurrence of a threat or 
danger” (Anderson, 2010: 780).  
Precautionary risk introduces within the computation of the future its very limit, the 
infinity of uncertainty and potential damage. It is therefore exactly the opposite of 
prudence: if the latter recommended what ‘precautions’ to take under conditions of 
knowledge, the former demands that we act under scientific and causal uncertainty. The 
weight of the future is not simply that of contingency, but that of catastrophic 
contingency (Aradau & von Munster, 2007: 101). 
So, for example, in the case of terrorism, the US National Security Strategy changed from “a posture of 
mutual deterrence to ‘anticipatory action’ against ‘[e]merging threats before they are fully formed’” 
(US Government, 2002: 4, quoted in Anderson, 2010: 790). Precaution has been invoked in ways that 
increasingly authorize the state to intervene more aggressively and on wider populations of potential 
risk producers e.g., not only against individuals categorized as potential terrorists but also against 
members of the general population (airline travellers, tourists) to defend society in the name of 
potential – but unproven – security risks. If terrorist suspects cannot be clearly identified through 
intelligence and profiling, wider forms of surveillance are employed to target more individuals. For 
certain categories of people, it is no longer up to governments to demonstrate that individuals pose risk, 
but for individuals to prove that they do not; and more informed, open and democratic processes of 
giving greater voice to risk bearers, as advocated by proponents of precaution, are conspicuous in their 
absence.  
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In sum, countervailing discourses, along with the knowledge and categories of identity 
associated with them, may provide opportunities for localized resistance to the dominant discourse of 
risk. However, because of intensification effects, such resistance can contribute to riskification insofar 
as the concept of risk remains central, alternative forms of knowledge are incorporated into existing 
bodies of risk knowledge, and risk assessors and managers continue to remain privileged – authorized 
to act on larger numbers of potential risk producers in relation to uncertain risks. The irony is that 
attempts to recognize the uncertain status of risk knowledge and the unknowability of the future may 
fail to facilitate radical new approaches that draw on concepts other than risk. Instead, they reproduce 
approaches in which risk remains central, while justifying draconian risk management actions on the 
grounds of the magnitude of unknowable hazards, regardless of the probability of them occurring.  
Discipline and the Real-Time Organizing of Risk 
Discipline, according to Foucault, is “a form of self-regulation” (Mills, 2003: 43). It works 
directly on individuals and their capacity to act, through surveillance, training, and exercises associated 
with key institutions (particularly the prison, but also the army, factories, schools, etc.). It targets 
actions and capacities, producing “docile bodies” which regulate themselves through self-discipline and 
self-control (Foucault, 1979: 135).  
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for 
the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously on himself; he inscribes in 
himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection (Foucault, 1979: 202–3). 
These disciplining effects of a dominant discourse mean that, even when new forms of knowledge and 
new identities are opened up by actors deviating from what is considered to be disciplined behaviour, 
this resistance can come to be subsumed by the dominant discourse. 
Discipline is clearly evident in the case of the dominant discourse of risk where, in organizing 
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risks that are perceived to be materializing in real-time, individuals are subjected to disciplinary power 
emanating from the past, present and future. First, discipline bears down from the past through the 
legacy of the prior prospective organizing of risk inscribed in plans, scripts and protocols, in which the 
individual has been trained and which he or she is expected to enact in the present, thus structuring and 
limiting the range of responses available as a risk materializes. Second, individuals who might 
contemplate improvising by deviating from plans, scripts and protocols in real-time do so knowing they 
may face the possibility of being immediately disciplined in the present by orders to revert to the plan, 
possibly accompanied by punishment, from risk arbiters occupying superior positions in the command-
and-control hierarchy in which they are situated. Third, discipline also emanates from the future 
insomuch as individuals anticipate subsequent retrospective organizing of risk in the form of an internal 
or external review in which they may be held accountable for any improvisation. 
The threat of being disciplined in the future is particularly consequential since, even when it 
appears to make sense to deviate from plans, scripts and protocols at the time the risk materializes, 
individuals may still be punished later as a result of post-incident investigations involving different 
actors, as Gephart (1993: 1503) found in his study of an inquiry into a pipeline explosion. In this case, a 
district manager had authorized greater discretion for employees at the local site in order to allow them 
respond to local conditions. However, during the inquiry, actors at other levels reinforced the 
importance of command-and-control conceptions of hierarchy in the organization:  
The worker constructed the organization as a model of compliance – a hierarchy 
wherein the foreman, his supervisor, gave him orders related to the management of risks 
and dangers. The assistant manager constructed the organization as a hierarchy wherein 
he reported to the district manager. He would have [acted] if commanded or authorized 
to do so ... In the board's construction, the company was a clear hierarchy of authority in 
which the district manager was the supervisor and a clear set of rules and policies 
37 
 
demanded compliance. If these had been followed, the accident would have been 
avoided. 
The plant manager was found by the inquiry to be responsible for the accident because he failed to use 
his hierarchical position to direct subordinates according to pre-determined plans, scripts and protocols 
(Gephart, 1993). The tendency of reviews and inquiries to arrive at such findings means that those who 
do improvise in real-time are highly vulnerable to discipline in the future.  
The problem is further compounded because questions of whether individuals were right to 
deviate from plans, scripts and protocols, as well as whether the new risk knowledge they generated in 
doing so is valid, can only be answered after the fact, through the retrospective organizing of risk. In 
the immediate moment of organizing a risk as it is materializing, there is no ‘regime of truth’ to 
legitimate the knowledge generated in real-time. (This situation is different from both the prospective 
mode where the body of risk knowledge is validated through a range of widely accepted scientific 
conventions that act as regimes of truth, and the retrospective mode where reviews and inquiries are 
themselves highly institutionalized regimes of truth.) The status of risk knowledge produced in real-
time is therefore only ever provisional; it can only be legitimated after-the-fact through the 
retrospective organizing of risk during which the partial, experiential and situated aspects of knowledge 
that are vital to organizing risk in real-time are often lost.  
In sum, the authorization of locally situated risk assessors-cum-managers-cum-bearers to 
exercise discretion and act on their experiential knowledge may provide opportunities for localized 
resistance to the dominant discourse of risk. However, because of disciplinary effects, such resistance 
can contribute to riskification insofar as, even if plans, scripts and protocols are made less constraining 
to reduce the effects of discipline emanating from the past, and even if risk arbiters allow greater scope 
for improvisation to reduce the effects of discipline emanating in the present, the individual still 
remains subject to possible discipline in the future. In addition, the knowledge produced in real-time on 
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which improvisation is based can only ever be provisional in the absence of a real-time regime of truth 
– its status depends upon the subsequent retrospective organizing of risk, which will determine whether 
the risk assessor-cum-manager-cum-bearer was inspired or negligent in improvising. The irony is that 
attempts to facilitate improvisation by risk assessors-cum-managers-cum-bearers may promote more, 
not less, compliance with pre-determined plans, scripts and protocols and/or orders from risk arbiters. It 
may be far less risky for individuals to comply with pre-determined plans, scripts and protocols – even 
if they believe them to be wrong – than it is to risk being found retrospectively to have been an 
inadequate or irresponsible risk assessor/manager or to have been a risk producer because of real-time 
improvisation.  
Governmentality and the Retrospective Organizing of Risk 
Governmentality is the ‘conduct of conduct’ of a population (rather than of an individual, which 
is the target of discipline), created by establishing conditions and arranging contexts in ways that lead 
people to act in certain ways and not others, and undertaken in the name of the wellbeing of the 
population at large (Li, 2007). In modern society, power relations “have been progressively 
governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the 
auspices of, state institutions” (Foucault, 2000: 345) as government acts to ensure the wealth, welfare, 
productivity and security of the population for which it claims to be responsible. Governmentality 
targets populations as defined by aggregated knowledge, which is generated by a wide range of 
professional groups, such as psychologists, psychiatrists, accountants, managers, scientists, 
demographers, etc., and through an assemblage of “institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections” 
(Foucault, 2002: 219). As this knowledge accumulates, different categories of identity are produced, 
into which people are classified based on such characteristics as age, gender, location, physical or 
health condition, economic status, occupation, etc. Programs, policies and practices then incorporate 
these categories, subsequently shaping – and constraining – the options available to the individuals who 
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occupy them. The governmentality effects of a dominant discourse mean that, even when new forms of 
knowledge and new identities are opened up by what appears to be fundamental questioning of the 
status quo, this resistance can come to be subsumed by the dominant discourse. 
Governmentality is clearly evident in the case of the dominant discourse of risk insofar as 
populations of individuals are classified in relation to risk. For example, many reviews and inquiries 
retrospectively organizing risks associated with retirement, pensions, health, employment, etc. 
recommend that, in the future, individuals should take greater responsibility for their own risks (Beck 
& Beck-Gersheim, 2002; Bickerstaff &Walker, 2002; Elliott, 2002; Rose, 1989). Such 
recommendations serve to construct citizens “of enterprise and production” (Foucault, 2008: 147) who 
act as “entrepreneurs of themselves, shaping their own lives through the choices they make,” and 
taking on responsibility for risk (Rose, 1989: 226).  
[T]he individual is increasingly viewed today as an active agent in the risk-monitoring 
of collectively produced dangers; risk-information, risk-detection and risk-management 
is more and more constructed as and designed as a matter of private responsibility and 
personal security (Elliott 2002: 305). 
In this way, the lessons and recommendations derived by risk adjudicators help to specify what it is to 
be entrepreneurial in today’s risk society i.e., what individuals must do to engage in the necessary ‘risk 
work’ to avoid hazards or deal with them if they arise.  
On the surface, this shift in locus of responsibility seems radical and progressive in re-
constructing traditional risk identities – collapsing the distinction between the identities of risk bearers 
and risk assessors/managers in ways that ostensibly make the former less dependent on the latter for 
their protection against hazards; and producing the entrepreneurial risk bearer-cum-assessor-cum-
manager. However, the need to comply with norms defined in terms of risk has not been eliminated: 
instead, compliant subjects must take on responsibilities that once would have been assumed by the 
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government or the organization. Rather than the state bearing the risks of old age, illness and poverty 
among its citizens, recent changes in tax policies, social programs, and employer practices have 
transferred the burden of risk management to the individual (Hacker, 2006; Vaz & Bruno, 2003). 
Similarly, instead of the organization assuming the risk of falls in demand and employing idle workers, 
a contingent labour force now assumes these risks. As Gephart (2002: 333) writes, “through the 
changing nature of the employment relationship and contract, beneﬁts and even salary can be cut, and 
workers can be required to expend their own resources to manage and mitigate workplace risks and 
damages”. In her study of the Internet industry, Neff (2012: 2) draws a similar conclusion: “economic 
risk in modern life has increasingly become privatized and individualized”.  
Governmentality also has consequences for actors categorized as not being compliant risk 
subjects, as entire categories of individuals are labelled and understood as being insufficiently 
entrepreneurial in terms of assessing and managing risk. These individuals are often excluded or 
marginalized to the extent that subjects ‘at risk’ can become categorized as risk producers. For 
example, individuals who are HIV positive and at risk from various diseases have come to be blamed 
for both their own condition and for the danger they pose to others through sexual behaviour deemed 
risky (Davis, 2007). Older workers who are at risk of unemployment have come to be deemed as 
posing too much risk to small businesses start-up programs – because of their purportedly unwise 
investment decisions – and hence are excluded from them (Ainsworth & Hardy, 2009). Merchant 
seamen, who are at risk of injury and death from their dangerous occupation, are deemed to be 
“operational and economic risk objects” that are “costly and prone to failure” by their employers 
(Kendra, 2007: 33). In being categorized as not only vulnerable, but also ‘dangerous,’ populations of 
risk bearers-cum-producers are subjected to further surveillance, monitoring and intervention in order 
to manage the risks they are deemed to produce for society.  
People who have been marginalized or excluded due to class, gender, race and other 
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bases of social inequality … are often seen as being both at-risk and risky themselves. 
Marginalized people are exposed to more risks, but are also themselves categorized as 
bad risks (Doyle, 2007: 8).  
Thus individual behaviour comes under scrutiny as the individual is blamed for inadequately managing 
risks, rather than the government that once supported them or the organizations that employ them 
(Beck & Beck-Gersheim, 2002; Bickerstaff &Walker, 2002). 
These categories of compliant and non-compliant subjects are formed on the basis, not of 
individuals’ personal experiences of the risks in question, but on the basis of holistic, convergent 
accounts of the past, aggregated at the level of populations. In creating these categories, as well as 
establishing how each is to be treated, governmentality contributes to a process whereby the burden of 
risk is shifted to individuals, while more organizations are authorized to act in the name of risk in 
relation to both compliant and non-compliant subjects. First, compliant subjects must be familiar with 
the existing body of risk knowledge in order to make informed decisions. To do so, they depend on the 
assistance of expert organizations. For example, consumers are increasingly encouraged to carry out 
their own due diligence in researching the health effects of chemicals found in the consumer products 
they buy, in order to identify any risks prior to purchase, instead of relying on government regulation 
(Mackendrick, 2011), which means consumers must acquire more knowledge about chemical risks 
(what are the substances in the product, what are the hazards linked causally to these substances, etc.). 
Consequently, scientific, professional and government organizations retain their privileged position 
insofar as they are the producers of this information; while consumer organizations and environmental 
health NGOs carve out important new informational and certification roles, often using web-sites to 
convey and distribute this information, in this expanding political economy of risk. Second, those 
categorized as noncompliant are managed by a wide range of medical, welfare, psychiatric and 
custodial organizations authorized to monitor, regulate, and act upon them, resulting in an expanding 
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implementation of techniques of calculation, surveillance and administration, all in the name of risk. 
For example, a wide range of private, public and not-for-profit organizations are springing up to assist 
the elderly in managing financial risk during retirement, in ways designed to reduce the risks of the 
elderly becoming a burden on social and health services (e.g., Miller & Weissert, 2000). 
In sum, challenging traditional risk identities, such as enabling risk bearers to take 
responsibility for risk assessment and management, may provide opportunities for localized resistance 
to the dominant discourse. However, because of governmentality effects, such resistance can contribute 
to riskification insofar as more areas of an individual’s life become subjected to the discourse of risk, 
resulting in a greater need for them to master existing bodies of risk knowledge. In addition, new types 
of expert organizations emerge either to provide risk bearers-cum-assessors-cum-managers with the 
risk knowledge they need to assess and manage their own risks, or to monitor risk bearers-cum-
producers who are unable to self-manage risk. The irony is that attempts to individualize risk by 
authorizing risk-bearers to also be risk assessors and managers may serve to authorize more 
organizations to act in the name of risk and to intervene more aggressively in individuals’ lives in 
relation to their self-management of risk. 
CONCLUSION 
Our integrated framework, based on Foucauldian concepts, is applicable to different types of 
risk (e.g., financial, technological, social, and environmental). It identifies three modes for organizing 
risk – prospectively, in real-time, and retrospectively – each of which is situated in the dominant 
discourse of risk. Previous discussions of the dominant discourse of risk emphasize the prospective 
organizing of risk (e.g. Jasanoff, 1998; Lupton, 1999; Lupton, 2013), whereas our framework extends it 
to the other modes in a systematic way, providing a common language for understanding, researching 
and critiquing organizing in and across all three modes. Our framework proposes an alternative way of 
organizing risk in each mode which is better able to deal with unfamiliar and systemic risks, risks that 
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materialize in unexpected ways, and risks for which significant changes are desired in the way they are 
organized in the future. However, it acknowledges that since these alternative ways of organizing 
require resisting the dominant discourse of risk, enacting them is likely to be difficult. Our second order 
of critique also extends existing critical research on risk, which has tended to focus on governmentality, 
to include the effects of intensification and discipline; and, by introducing the concept of riskification, 
provides a way for organizational researchers to theorize the pervasive and growing preoccupation with 
risk and organizing. 
We also make important contributions to understanding risk knowledge by identifying 
similarities and differences in the bodies of risk knowledge that are privileged in each mode, rather 
than simply concentrating on the taken-for-granted status of risk knowledge produced and applied 
prospectively.  This has allowed us to interrogate risk knowledge more closely by, for example, 
showing the provisional status of risk knowledge produced in real-time owing to the absence of a 
regime of truth, as well as the notional status of the holistic, convergent, authoritative risk knowledge 
produced retrospectively. Finally, we have added to understandings of risk identities by considering the 
risk arbiter and risk adjudicator, whereas previous research has tended to focus on risk assessors, risk 
managers, risk producers and risk bearers; and by examining the fluidity of risk identities – typically 
viewed through the prism of clearly defined singular roles – to consider the implications of shifting and 
multiple identities e.g., the risk assessor-cum-manager-cum-bearer (real-time mode), as well as the risk 
bearer-cum-assessor-cum-manager and the risk bearer-cum-producer (retrospective mode). 
Our framework provides a foundation for future research on risk and organizing that can 
incorporate a range of research approaches and methods. First, quantitative studies would help establish 
the prevalence of the common ways of organizing risk associated with each mode and ascertain their 
effectiveness and limitations. Similarly, quantitative work would also help to establish where the 
alternative ways of organizing risk in each of the three modes are most likely to be found, and how 
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effective they are in situations where risks are unfamiliar and systemic, where risks materialize 
unexpectedly, or where significant changes are desired. Quantitative comparisons would also be useful 
to ascertain whether resisting the dominant discourse is more common in organizations with particular 
features relating to stage of organizational life cycle, size, demographic features of organizational 
members, organizational culture, etc. For example, one might expect entrepreneurial start-ups and 
small organizations, as well organizations led by young individuals, to be more informal, less 
bureaucratic and more prone to problematize prevailing knowledge and to challenge prevailing 
identities.  
Similarly, organizations with different cultures may also be more or less conducive to enacting 
alternative ways of organizing risk. Drawing on dimensions of organizational culture discussed in 
Hofstede (1994: 10), it seems likely that it would be more difficult to enact alternative ways of 
organizing risk where the culture is process-oriented (versus results-oriented) because such 
organizations are “dominated by technical and bureaucratic routines”; tightly-controlled (versus 
loosely-controlled) because such organizations have a high degree of formality; and normative (versus 
pragmatic) because such organizations tend to be rigid. Some researchers have explicitly examined 
“risk culture” and how it varies across organizations (Bozeman & Kingsley, 1998), differentiating 
between ‘engineered’ and ‘organic’ approaches to risk (Power, Ashby & Palermo, 2013). The former 
would appear to be less amenable to alternative ways of organizing risk, because such risk cultures 
emphasize traditional authority relations, the use of metrics, and formal, standardized procedures. 
Second, our framework provides avenues for future qualitative research. Qualitative case 
studies would provide greater in-depth understanding of how common ways of organizing risk are held 
in place by the dominant discourse of risk, how the alternative ways are better able to address the 
limitations, and how the difficulties in enacting these alternative ways are manifested. Insofar as some 
organizations may engage with all three modes in dealing with particular risks, qualitative case studies 
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could compare how risk is organized in each of the modes within a single organization. Longitudinal 
research could examine how organizations manage the transitions between the modes. We know little 
about the transition from prospective to real-time organizing as a risk becomes constructed as one that 
is actually materializing, or the organizational processes through which some risk incidents are put on 
the agenda for review while others are not. Finally, while there is a considerable amount of 
organizational research on what happens during public inquiries, there is far less research on internal 
organizational reviews of incidents or on what happens following inquiries and reviews, i.e., whether 
and how organizations engage (or not) with recommendations by organizing risks differently (or not) in 
the future.  
Third, the framework lends itself to work that is explicitly critical. Studies could, for example, 
interrogate the micro-dynamics of how risk knowledge comes to assume such a privileged status in 
more detail, explore how risk knowledge intersects with other established bodies of knowledge, and 
examine whether and how risk knowledge is supported by other dominant discourses such as neo-
liberalism and globalization. Researchers might examine real-time risk knowledge from the perspective 
of situated knowledge (Lave & Wenger, 1991). Ethnographies might examine precisely why it is 
difficult to validate situated, embodied risk knowledge in real-time by constructing a real-time ‘regime 
of truth’. Research could explore the barriers that prevent partial accounts and alternative forms of 
knowledge (e.g., gestures, tacit, embodied knowledge) from being seen as valid in the retrospective 
organizing of risk. Critical work could also consider the construction of risk identities, drawing on 
Foucault’s (2000) conception of a de-centred, constructed self, as well as the power relations among 
them and whether these power relations change when organizations attempt to enact alternative ways of 
organizing risk.  
The concept of riskification also invites a wide range of critical studies. With regard to 
intensification, researchers could examine the expanding frontiers of risk discourse into more and more 
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realms of organizational life, displacing other ways of talking about the world. Alternatively, research 
might be conducted on ‘de-intensification’ (Hardy & Thomas, 2014) by examining when and how 
other discourses juxtaposed against this dominant discourse of risk create different ‘conditions of 
possibility’ for talking about and acting on phenomena without reference to the concept of risk 
(Maguire & Hardy, 2006). In the case of discipline, future research might examine how the intersection 
of past, present and future bearing down on employees is experienced, especially in relation to different 
types of organizational members (e.g., front line workers vs. middle managers; or different types of 
professionals), as well as how this discipline shapes their subjectivity and affects their ability to 
improvise in their responses to risk incidents. In relation to governmentality, studies might examine the 
social and personal implications of the process of individualizing risk, and of attaching the concept of 
risk to categories of people previously understood through other concepts.  
Our work has practical implications. Specifically, our theorizing underlines how important it is 
for organizations to valorize the problematization of taken-for-granted ways of organizing risk 
especially when dealing with risks that are constructed as unfamiliar or materializing in unexpected 
ways or, post-incident, require significant changes in how they are to be organized; and to support 
organizational members who draw attention to “potential inadequacies in knowledge” (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2013: 240) and question “existing attention to risk and its model of identification, recognition 
and definition” (Hutter & Power, 2005: 11). More generally, managers need to be more sceptical of 
existing bodies of knowledge as a basis for the prospective organizing of risk and to acknowledge that 
risk incidents can never be perfectly predicted or prevented. As far as the real-time organizing of risk is 
concerned, managers and employees need to be more alert to weak signals and evidence about 
imminent risks that comes in unexpected forms or from unexpected sources, as well as to equivocal 
information that suggests risks may be materializing in unanticipated or unimagined ways. In the case 
of the retrospective organizing of risk, inquiries, hearings and reviews should be carried out in ways 
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that attempt to respect and capture the heterogeneity of actors’ experiences for the purposes of 
producing new risk knowledge that is actionable by those supposed to implement it. Greater skepticism 
of omniscient accounts would likely result in a greater acceptance of the provisional and partial nature 
of knowledge which, in turn, would inform the subsequent prospective organizing of risk, making it 
more sensitive to the limitations of prevailing expert knowledge and the potential value of alternative 
paradigms.  
Final Words 
Risk is something we apparently cannot escape. It affects individuals and organizations through 
power relations associated with the dominant discourse of risk, and perpetuates itself through 
intensification, discipline and governmentality in ways that cannot be reduced to sovereign power and 
the actions of particular individuals. We therefore need new ways of viewing – and studying – how risk 
is organized, which are innovative, reflexive and, in some cases, radical.  
Research needs to be innovative in that the dominant discourse makes it difficult to abandon 
common and widespread ways of organizing risk. We therefore need new ideas about organizing risk. 
Research needs to be reflexive in recognizing the highly pervasive power effects of the dominant 
discourse of risk and how all actors are captured in a complex web of power relations. No single 
individual or group could have prevented the risks associated with the GFC or the Fukushima disaster 
from materializing; and it is doubtful that a single individual or group can ever transform the financial 
and energy sectors to preclude future risks from materializing. Only by engaging with the dominant 
discourse of risk reflexively can we hope to resist some of its effects. Finally, at least some research 
needs to be radical in challenging the very discourse of risk and even seeking to do away with its 
application altogether, in at least some domains of human endeavour. This is not to suggest that power 
effects would be eliminated, but they would be different. There are many reasons for advocating a 
radical approach, including the argument that the discourse of risk may be helping to produce or 
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aggravate harms, hazards and dangers because it creates the illusion of a knowable universe that has 
been tamed by scientists, engineers, financial analysts and other experts. Moreover, as this paper 
shows, the power relations associated with the discourse of risk distribute these harms, hazards and 
dangers unevenly. Certain individuals – often the more disadvantaged members of society – bear more 
of them than others (Scott, 2007). Without more radical research, particular voices, ways of knowing 
and forms of knowledge, as well as important questions related to culture, ethics, morality and quality 
of life, will be systematically excluded. 
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Table 1: A Summary of the Dominant Discourse of Risk 
 
Discourse The Discourse of Risk 
A discourse is a collection 
of interrelated texts and 
practices “that 
systematically form the 
object of which they 
speak” 
 
The discourse of risk is constituted by the following texts and practices that 
systematically bring ‘risk’, as an object of knowledge, into existence.  
• Examples of texts include: scientific articles, textbooks on risk assessment and 
risk management, ISO risk principles and guidelines, emergency preparedness 
handbooks, emergency procedure manuals, emergency preparedness checklists, 
aggregated risk data reports, accident reviews, inquiry reports, submissions to 
public hearings, compliance reports, actuarial reports, media stories, 
government legislation, annual reports, scientific and technical reports. 
• Examples of practices include: use of probability and statistical techniques, 
preparation of risk matrices, carrying out event tree/fault tree analysis, 
calculating risk-benefit ratios, preparing emergency preparedness plans, filling 
in emergency preparedness checklists, rehearsing accident protocols, 
conducting emergency simulations, monitoring for early warnings, auditing, 
completing accident or incident reports, holding hearings, calling witnesses, 
drafting inquiry reports, processing data to update actuarial tables. 
A dominant discourse has additional features: 
Its constituting texts and 
practices draw on each 
other in well-established 
ways to construct 
convergent, widely shared 
meanings of particular 
phenomena  
• Risk is widely understood to be the probability of an adverse effect or negative 
event of some magnitude – a harm, hazard or danger of some kind that can be 
managed if the likelihood of its occurrence and nature of its effects can be 
accurately assessed. 
• Risk assessment is widely understood as ‘science’ (evidence- and fact-based, 
value-free). 
• Risk management is understood as ‘policy’ (values-based, involving trade-offs 
between multiple objectives).  
It produces an accepted, 
taken for granted body of 
knowledge that functions 
as if it were true and acts 
as a ‘regime of truth’. 
The body of risk knowledge assumes risk to be ‘true’ i.e., it is accurately and 
objectively identifiable through: 
• The development of knowledge derived from the past through scientific 
measurement and analytical reasoning; 
• The application of knowledge in the form of specific, widely accepted, 
institutionalized risk analysis/measurement techniques.  
It offers a delimited set of 
categories of identity that 
are meaningful and 
legitimate, some of which 
are authorized over others, 
and all of which are 
situated in the discourse 
and constrained and/or 
enabled by it, albeit 
unequally and in different 
ways 
Key categories of identity include:  
• Risk assessors who determine the nature, level and probability of harm, 
damage or loss;  
• Risk managers who are responsible for reducing risk to some level deemed 
acceptable;  
• Risk producers whose actions potentially generate hazards or cause harms, 
damage or losses;  
• Risk bearers who are harmed or bear damage/losses when hazards are realized.  
• Risk arbiters who are responsible for overseeing responses to risk incidents as 
they unfold in real-time;  
• Risk adjudicators, who review incidents where risks have (or have almost) 
materialized to determine, after the fact, who produced the risk and who bore 
it, as well as who should have assessed or managed it more effectively. 
64 
Table 2: A Foucauldian Framework for Understanding the Organizing of Risk 
 Prospective 
Organizing of Risk 
Real-time 
Organizing of Risk 
Retrospective 
Organizing of Risk 
What is the 
main body of 
literature? 
Risk analysis: focuses on 
inter-organizational 
regulatory environments; 
and risk management 
and compliance inside 
organizations 
Disasters, crisis 
management, high 
reliability organizations: 
focuses on internal 
organizational responses; 
some studies of inter-
organizational dynamics 
Public inquiries and 
hearings: focuses mainly 
on formal hearings that 
involve multiple external 
stakeholders; few studies 
on internal 
organizational reviews 
What is the 
main temporal 
focus of 
organizing 
risk? 
What may happen, i.e. 
the future 
What is happening, i.e. 
the present 
What did happen and 
what should have 
happened, i.e. the past, 
and what should happen, 
i.e. the future 
What is the 
context of 
organizing 
risk?  
Organizing of risk is 
typically mediated and 
decontextualized i.e., 
risk is assessed and 
managed at a distance 
from when and where 
the risk would 
materialize 
Organizing of risk is 
typically embedded, i.e., 
risk is assessed and 
managed in proximity to 
when and where the risk 
is materializing  
Organizing of risk is 
typically mediated and 
decontextualized, i.e., 
risk is assessed and 
managed after and at a 
distance from where the 
risk did (or nearly did) 
materialize  
How is risk 
normalized? 
Predict and prevent: 
identify and address risk 
before it materializes, 
through measurements, 
calculations and 
associated actions to 
reduce the likelihood and 
extent of negative effects  
Control and contain: 
identify and address risk 
as it is materializing, 
through implementation 
of predetermined plans, 
protocols and scripts to 
avoid or reduce the 
extent of negative effects  
Review and revise: 
identify and address risk 
after it has (or nearly 
has) materialized, 
through the construction 
of holistic, convergent, 
authoritative accounts; 
and recommendations 
for the future organizing 
of risk  
What are the 
power 
relations 
associated 
with the 
dominant 
discourse of 
risk? 
The dominant discourse 
of risk privileges expert 
risk knowledge in the 
form of facts, 
correlations and causal 
models over other forms 
of knowledge; and 
authorizes risk assessors 
and risk managers over 
other risk identities. 
The dominant discourse 
of risk privileges expert 
risk knowledge in the 
form of previously 
produced plans, scripts 
and protocols over other 
forms of knowledge; and 
authorizes risk arbiters 
over other risk identities. 
The dominant discourse 
of risk privileges expert 
risk knowledge in the 
form of a holistic, 
convergent account 
containing lessons and 
recommendations; and 
authorizes risk 
adjudicators over other 
risk identities.  
 
What is the 
most common 
way of 
organizing 
risk, because 
of the 
dominant 
discourse of 
Risk is organized 
prospectively through 
the production of expert 
risk knowledge derived 
from empirical 
information about the 
past, which has been 
abstracted into 
Risk is organized in real-
time through the 
implementation of expert 
risk knowledge derived 
from empirical 
information about the 
past, which has been 
abstracted into 
Risk is organized 
retrospectively through 
the production of expert 
risk knowledge derived 
from empirical 
information about the 
past, which has been 
abstracted into 
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risk? regularities in the form 
of facts, correlations and 
causal models, and 
applied to a hypothetical 
future by risk assessors. 
This knowledge then 
forms the basis of 
actions taken by risk 
managers to protect risk 
bearers and restrict risk 
producers. 
regularities in the form 
of plans, scripts and 
protocols. This 
knowledge then forms 
the basis of actions taken 
in a specific present by 
risk assessors-cum-
managers-cum-bearers, 
subject to endorsement 
from risk arbiters. 
regularities in the form 
of a holistic, convergent 
account containing 
lessons and 
recommendations by risk 
adjudicators. This 
knowledge then forms 
the basis of actions to be 
taken in the future by 
other risk identities. 
What are the 
limitations of 
the most 
common way 
of organizing 
risk? 
Encounters difficulty in 
dealing with unfamiliar 
and systemic risks 
Encounters difficulty in 
dealing with risks that 
materialize in 
unexpected ways 
Encounters difficulty in 
bringing about 
significant changes in 
how risk is organized in 
the future 
What is an 
alternative 
way of 
organizing 
risk? 
 
Problematizing existing 
expert risk knowledge 
and the ability of the past 
to predict the future; 
incorporating lay 
knowledge produced by 
risk bearers and other 
risk identities; and 
challenging the existing 
hierarchy of risk 
identities. 
Problematizing existing 
expert risk knowledge 
and ability of the past to 
apply to the present; 
incorporating the 
experiential knowledge 
of locally situated risk 
assessors-cum-
managers-cum-bearers; 
and challenging the 
hierarchy of risk 
identities  
Problematizing existing 
expert risk knowledge 
and the ability of a 
holistic, convergent 
account of the past to 
add usefully to it; 
incorporating partial, 
experiential knowledge 
in the form of multiple, 
contradictory accounts; 
and challenging the 
hierarchy of risk 
identities. 
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Table 3. Resistance and Riskification in Three Modes for Organizing Risk 
 Prospective 
Organizing of Risk 
Real-Time 
Organizing of Risk 
Retrospective 
Organizing of Risk 
Alternative way 
of organizing 
risk to resist the 
dominant 
discourse of risk 
 
Problematizing existing 
expert risk knowledge and 
the ability of the past to 
predict the future; 
incorporating lay 
knowledge produced by 
risk bearers and other risk 
identities; and challenging 
the hierarchy of risk 
identities. 
Problematizing existing 
expert risk knowledge and 
ability of the past to apply 
to the present; 
incorporating the 
experiential knowledge of 
locally situated risk 
assessors-cum-managers-
cum-bearers; and 
challenging the hierarchy 
of risk identities. 
Problematizing existing 
expert risk knowledge and 
the ability of a holistic, 
convergent account of the 
past to add usefully to it; 
incorporating partial, 
experiential knowledge in 
the form of multiple, 
contradictory accounts; and 
challenging the hierarchy of 
risk identities.  
Foucauldian 
concept to shed 
light on 
resistance  
Intensification  Discipline Governmentality 
How resistance 
can contribute 
to riskification 
Countervailing discourse 
becomes subordinated to 
the discourse of risk. 
Alternative forms of 
knowledge become 
incorporated into existing 
bodies of risk knowledge. 
Risk assessors and 
managers are authorized 
to act on larger numbers 
of potential risk producers 
in relation to uncertain 
risks. 
Risk assessors-cum-
managers-cum-bearers are 
subject to discipline 
emanating from past, 
present and future based 
on existing bodies of risk 
knowledge.  
Knowledge produced in 
real-time is only 
provisional – its status 
depends upon the 
subsequent retrospective 
organizing of risk. 
More areas of individuals’ 
lives become subjected to 
the discourse of risk. 
Risk bearers-cum-assessors-
cum-managers have to 
master existing bodies of 
risk knowledge. 
New types of expert 
organizations emerge to 
provide risk knowledge to 
risk bearers-cum-assessors-
cum-managers and to 
monitor risk bearers-cum-
producers. 
Possible ironies 
associated with 
attempts to resist 
the dominant 
discourse of risk 
Attempts to recognize the 
uncertain status of risk 
knowledge and the 
unknowability of the 
future may fail to facilitate 
new approaches that draw 
on concepts other than 
risk. Instead, risk remains 
central and draconian risk 
management actions are 
justified on the grounds of 
the magnitude of 
unknowable hazards, 
regardless of the 
probability of them 
occurring. 
Attempts to facilitate 
improvisation by risk 
assessors-cum-managers-
cum-bearers may promote 
more, not less, compliance 
with pre-determined plans, 
scripts and protocols 
and/or orders from risk 
arbiters. Even if 
individuals believe them 
to be wrong, it may be less 
risky to comply, rather 
than risk being found 
retrospectively to have 
been an inadequate risk 
assessor/manager or risk 
producer. 
Attempts to individualize 
risk by authorizing risk-
bearers to also be risk 
assessors and managers 
may serve to authorize more 
organizations to act in the 
name of risk and to 
intervene more aggressively 
in individuals’ lives in 
relation to their self-
management of risk. 
 
  
67 
Cynthia Hardy (chardy@unimelb.edu.au) is a University of Melbourne Laureate Professor and an 
Honorary Professor at Cardiff Business School. She received her PhD from the University of 
Warwick. Her current research focuses on discourse and institutional change, as well as the meaning 
of age in organizations. 
 
Steve Maguire (steve.maguire@mcgill.ca) is Professor of Strategy and Organization at the Desautels 
Faculty of Management at McGill University, and Director of the Marcel Desautels Institute for 
Integrated Management. He received his PhD from HEC-Montreal. His research focuses on risk and 
technological and institutional change, with an emphasis on chemicals management. 
 
 
